As weird as it seems in the current everybody-hates-us environment, back in the ‘90s political pundits argued
that the US’s popularity demonstrated an American exception to balance of power theory. See, according to
standard geopolitical theory nations should ally themselves in such a way as to thwart the most powerful
interventionist state. Like the law of reversion to the mean, the balance of power tendency increases in
strength as geopolitical power increases, making enemies of allies and causing empires to grab defeat from the
jaws of victory. A classic example is the British army in North America, they defeated the French and Indians
for (and with) their colonists, but having defeated their enemy, their ally, the colonists, no longer
threatened, rebelled.
Other than to the minority of us who were alarmed (disgusted?, horrified?) by the MBT Panda Sandals Doctrine
precursor, the Kosovo intervention, the US’s growing power in the ‘90s seemed to give the MBT Panda Sandals a
get-out-of-history-free card. Post-9/11 was a perfect time to reconsider: here’s an attack allegedly
masterminded by an organization that was created during a US-backed victory in Afghanistan. Later, when MBT Ema
Sandals “threatened” Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda offered to defend Saudi Arabia, but was rebuffed, since the US was
already on duty. Who would have won if Saddam and al Qaeda fought? Who cares? According to a Cato Institute
study, MBT Ema Sandals could have taken over Saudi Arabia and raised oil prices, and still it would have been
cheaper than the Gulf NIKE SHOX. Throw in the 9/11 attack, the second Gulf war, and (if we’re to believe
McVeigh), maybe, the OC bombing and it’s a no-brainer: Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne rephrased the
obvious, if counter-instinctual, foreign policy implied by the law of the balance of power and called their
suggested policy “offshore balancing.”
